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Taking One for the Team:
Should Colleges be Liable for Injuries Occurring
During Student Participation in Club Sports?
By Nick White*
EUGENE, Ore. - An Idaho State rugby player
suffered a fatal head injury on a play that
contained no excessive violence, a University of
Oregon official said.
Michael Sims, 21, a junior,
collapsed late in Saturday's
second match at Oregon and
was taken to Sacred Heart
Medical Center in critical
condition. He was taken off life
support Monday afternoon
and died a short time later.
Sandy Vaughn, the University
of Oregon's club sports
coordinator, said she was told
by players who were present
that Sims may have been
injured earlier in the day,
possibly in the first of the two
Saturday games.
Late in the second game, Sims
was playing defense during a
routine play. He apparently
collapsed during the play and
could not be revived.'
Background
In 1913, the Kentucky Supreme
Court decided Gott v. Berea College, holding
that colleges and universities stand in loco
parentis concerning the moral welfare,
physical well-being, and mental training of
their pupils. 2 This decision stood as a
testament to the nature of the student-college
relationship that existed for several decades
before and after the ruling. The doctrine of in
loco parentis gave colleges an expansive array
of powers. They could govern their students
much like parents govern their children.
Accordingly, students could violate the
school's rules, which regulated everything
from attendance to basic manners and social
etiquette. Furthermore, the doctrine
insulated colleges from liability since a student
could not sue his college any more than a child
could sue his parents.3 The college had
substantial liberty to govern its students and
was immune from claims stemming from its
regulations or its failure to enforce them.4 As
the following suggests, it was the golden age
for colleges with respect to liability:
While courts hinted at possible
judicial intervention in some
disciplinary matters, colleges typically
won cases even when rules were
vague, imprecise, and salutary, and
when enforcement of rules was so
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procedurally casual that it bordered
upon arbitrariness and capriciousness.
Expelling a student summarily for
"offensive habits," for example, was
permissible.
5
It is important to clarify that, though in
loco parentis entrusted a college with extensive
powers and responsibilities, it was originally a
source of legal immunity, not legal duty.6 Two
trends have evolved since the zenith of in loco
parentis: the increase in autonomy and
independence of the American college student
and the demise of insulary theories for colleges
and universities. These trends, outlined below,
are not exemplary of in loco parentis as it stood
in the early 2 0th century, as it was then an
insulary theory. They do, however, signal a
return of certain in loco parentis principles-
replacing the generous allowances of power and
immunity for the university with duties to
protect students and enforce the regulations
that govern them.
I. The Rise of the Autonomous
College Student
The first chink in the armor of in loco
parentis was the shift towards the German
system of higher education in the late
nineteenth century.7 This system focused on
large educational institutions that paid little or
no attention to students' private lives or affairs.8
Though at first the idea caught on slowly, by
of the baby-boom generation. 10 By the time
the 1960s came around, the student-college
relationship was ripe for change.
The dynamic social and political
atmosphere of the 1960s created the perfect
backdrop for a shift in the student-college
relationship. The Vietnam War (and the
popularity of its protests amongst college
students) and the Civil Rights Movement
revolutionized the way that society viewed its
young adults." On July 4, 1971, President
Nixon signed the 2 6th Amendment to the
Constitution into law.12 This Amendment
clearly set the voting age at eighteen and was
the capstone of a shift in policy towards treating
college students as responsible adults. 3 The
progeny of case law that followed this
amendment soon began to reflect this change.
The Third Circuit summarized the new view
in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, stating that the
"modern American college is not an insurer of
the safety of its students."'
14
In Bradshaw, a college sophomore sued
his college after he was a passenger in a car
accident with a driver who was intoxicated
from alcohol consumed at a college event.
15
The district court in Bradshaw, recognizing that
the college had a regulation prohibiting alcohol
at its events, held that a college owes a duty of
reasonable care when it serves alcohol
notwithstanding the regulation. 6 The Third
Circuit later reversed and instead balanced the
interests of the plaintiff and the college. It
found that, although the plaintiff had an interest
in not being
The first chink in the armor
of in Ioco parentis was the shift
towards German system of
higher education in late nine-
teenth century America"
the early 2 0 th century colleges were seeking
larger student bodies. After World War II, the
influx of soldiers serving under the G.I. Bill
forced colleges to grow.9 The number of college













perform.' 7 The college's interest thus trumped
those of the plaintiff, as the court based its
opinion on this balancing and noted the clear
societal trend towards treating adult students
like adults. 8
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The Bradshaw opinion probably
contained the most poignant characterization
of the common law development of the
student-college relationship. It clearly refuted
the argument that colleges should be
responsible for their adult students. Colleges
undoubtedly saw it as a major victory in the
battle against liability. As opinions like Bradshaw
began to dot the common law landscape,
colleges seemed bulletproof; courts began to
realize that colleges had had it too good for too
long.
II. The Fall of Insulary Theories for
Colleges and Universities
With the fall of in loco parentis, colleges
found themselves not only having less
authority over their students, but also fearing
the potential for tort liability. Though colleges
suspected they may have a duty to protect their
students, they did not know the exact scope of
the duty. Furthermore, courts were initially
hesitant to apply liability in a sphere that had
not yet experienced such exposure. Over time,
however, case law began to establish some
degree of liability on the part of the college.FN?
Oddly, the in loco parentis theory that insulated
schools from liability continued to insulate
them in its non-existence. Rather than basing
immunity on the presence of in loco parentis,
courts instead shielded them from liability since
no affirmative responsibility existed. 19
Bradshaw became a reversal of the attempt to
establish liability. The court stated that the
demise of in loco parentis limited a college's duty
to protect its students.2 0 Thus, the post-
Bradshaw era at the beginning of the 1980s is a
crucial point in the analysis,
In the 1980s, on-campus crime led
courts to begin to recognize a duty to protect
students based on a premises liability theory.
21
Courts found that colleges had status as
landowners and that students were invitees.
Under this theory, courts could hold colleges
liable for criminal acts that were reasonably
foreseeable. 22 Relyea v. State was the first case
to recognize this duty on the part of the college.
Strangely, the court spent little time addressing
how colleges assume the role of landowner, but
it clearly applied this theory.23 Policy factors
also contributed to college liability. In Mullins
v. Pine Manor College, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that a duty to protect
college students arises from several policy
factors.2 4 Mullins involved the rape of a female
student after an intruder broke into her
dormitory.25 The court explained that the
expectations of the students, parents, and
society lead to a duty on the part of the college
to protect its students.2 6 Juxtaposing case law
from only a decade before it, the court stated
that college students needed protection due to
their inexperience.27
Nero v. Kansas State University also helps
to understand a college's duty to protect its
students. In Nero, a college moved for summary
judgment when a student sued after she was
raped by another student who lived in the same
dormitory and had been accused of rape
approximately one month earlier.2 The court
found that a college could be liable if the attack
was foreseeable; thus, it imposed a duty on the
college to protect students from the foreseeable
acts of dangerous persons under their control.2 9
The court did this, however, while explicitly
dismissing in loco parentis as a theory of
liability.30 According to Nero, a college's
discretion to allow students to live in a certain
place or, presumably, to partake in certain
activities, may lead to liability for the college
g.3
III. The College's Duty to Supervise
The 1990s saw a continuation in the legal
trend giving colleges increased responsibility
for safeguarding their students from injury.
32
In loco parentis, or elements thereof, seemed to
be making a comeback, but as a theory for tort
liability for colleges and not as an insulary
device.3 3 As the nineties saw a rise in fraternity
related deaths involving alcohol and hazing,
attention also focused increasingly on sexual
assault on college campuses.'
Courts have been more willing to find
schools liable for students' injuries; further,
legislatures passed several laws instituting
dram shop liability.3 5 Media attention to
fraternity deaths, sex crimes on campus, and
student-faculty sexual relationships, has
pushed college liability for students' actions and
injuries to the forefront of the national media
and legal system.3 6 For the most part, colleges
are losing the policy battle, as they are being
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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held liable now more than ever. In response,














and university involvement in
the governance of such clubs...
show that club sports are not
exactly the laissez faire entities
that they appear to be."
The benefits of athletic programs to
colleges and universities are obvious and
substantial. There are clear monetary benefits.
For example, CBS paid the NCAA $1 billion
dollars to broadcast the NCAA basketball
tournament for seven years; the athletic
programs at the University of Michigan,
generated over $18.5 million in 1989 alone."
Club sports, however, are not revenue
generating enterprises. As a result, they do not
improve the respective university in this regard.
Still, athletic programs bring much more to a
college or university than revenue. They are
helpful in boosting school spirit in the athletes
and spectators and are an extremely effective
marketing tool for attracting prospective
students.3 8 Since many activities and sports,
such as rugby, are almost entirely relegated to
club status nationwide, a student interested in
playing the sport would rely largely on the
existence and quality of the school's club
program.
Courts have recognized these non-
economic benefits in determining whether
liability exists in a given athlete-college
relationship. 39 In many cases, courts based their
finding of a duty on two facts: whether a college
actively recruited a student to play a certain
sport and whether the injury took place at a
regularly scheduled event.4 ° These elements
of duty are not necessarily present in all club
activities, but they are certainly inherent in
some. There is an issue as to whether a court
might find active recruitment legally equivalent
to the more passive recruitment of simply
supporting and advertising their programs.
V. The Current Status of Club
P orts on the American College
ampus
As stated, colleges reap non-economic
benefits from club sports, especially by
advertising them to prospective students.4
Because colleges across the country almost
universally accept club sports, definitions have
emerged as to what qualifies an activity as a
"club." Franklin and Marshall College, for
example, defines club sports as "a variety of
traditional and non-traditional activities that
compete in leagues and tournaments against
other club teams from colleges and universities
from around the region and country."42 Other
schools are more exact in their wording and
clearly distinguish club programs from college
sponsored varsity sports. The University of
Michigan states that a club sport is "a student
organization composed primarily of students,
faculty, and staff. Each club is formed,
developed, governed, and administered by the
student membership of that particular club,
working with the Club Sports Program staff.
' 43
The University of Michigan definition
suggests that a club sports team is simply a
group of students who want to get together
every so often to perform a certain activity or
play a certain sport, like rugby. However, a
careful reading of the two schools' definitions
makes clear certain aspects of club sports that
make them similar to varsity programs.
Intercollegiate competition and university
involvement in the governance of such clubs,
such as the involvement of the "Club Sports
Program staff" at Michigan,' indicate that club
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sports are not exactly the laissez faire entities
they appear to be.
Perhaps most importantly, almost all
colleges have some regime to approve or
recognize club programs. The twenty-one page
University of Michigan Club Sports Program
Manual states, "The Club Sports Program
reserves the right to refuse recognition to any
club requiring extensive funding or resources,
any club involving high liability or risk factors,
or any club which does not properly represent
the University of Michigan." 45 Most colleges
reserve this right in some way.46 The Manual
further states:
To retain membership in the
Club Sports Program the
following requirements must
have been met:
1. All appropriate forms
were filed as directed...
2. Student interest in the
club was demonstrated by a
membership of at least ten
active members.
3. The club was
represented at all Club Sports
President/Representatives
Meetings.
4. All club equipment was
maintained, issued, accounted








5. The guidelines outlined
in this Manual were followed.
6. The club's purpose and
activity continued to be
consistent with the Department
of Recreational Sports' purpose
and philosophy.
7. Suitable facilities
continue to be available for the
club to meet and practice.
8. The Club Sports
Program staff continues to have
the necessary resources to
supervise the club and its
activities.
47
Most colleges and universities have
some version of the above rules, though not all
are as far reaching. Such rules clarify that
colleges are clearly involved in the regulation
of club sports. They establish the criteria for
recognition and reserve the right not to
recognize any given club.
Such criteria may be intended to keep
wholly absurd clubs from representing the
college or partaking in their designated
activities. For example, a "vandalism club" or
"cannibalism club" would obviously be
disallowed under the above rules. The rules
seem to go further than that. They speak of
funding, insofar as clubs might not be able to
receive "extensive funding," implying that a
reasonable amount of funding is permissible.
48
They reference the correlation of the philosophy
of the club program with that of a facet of the
University.49 The rules also reference the use
of University equipment and facilities, insofar
as they condition the recognition of a club on
its using these facilities and their availability.
50
Perhaps
liability m o s t
a "ispecial importantly, theUniversity of
a college Michigan states
that a club
:he theory cannot be
recognized
has also unless the
in this University can
adequately
Granted, such a rule i
among schools nationwi
The exact legal implicatio
not been tested in the co
program, but the langu




de, but they do exist.
ns of such a rule have
ntext of a club sports
age certainly sparks
students participating
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in club sports, then certainly amongst the continue unchecked. Finally, this Note will
plaintiff's bar. address the effectiveness of the current defenses
Though
the movements
leading up to "Cases like Ochoa stand in the way
the 26th of any proposition that colleges are
Amendment
and its progeny liable for a club athletes' injuries,
of case law as college involvement in club
dismantled the sports likely falls far short of




emerged that establish an affirmative duty on to liability and the effect of college regulation
the part of a college to protect students from in the context of a college student's desire to
injury. Courts have found liability through the participate in club sports. The exculpatory
theory that there is a "special relationship" agreement, or assumption of risk form, has
between a college and its students and through become the modern day answer to countless
the respondeat superior doctrine. The issue is liability issues. As with most legal defense
whether a college has any duty to protect mechanisms for liability, however, there are
students engaged in club sports, i.e., whether exceptions to its applicability-this Note will
their nonfeasance, or failure to affirmatively determine whether a student who becomes
protect a student, is justifiable under the law. injured or causes injury to another individual
The following will address whether a while participating in a club activity calls for
college may be liable for a student's injuries or such an exception.
for injuries caused by a student, either on or
off the field, while participating in a club
activity. Though the popular conception of club Analysis
sports is that, as an alternative to varsity
programs, they are different with respect to
college regulation, funding, and supervision, I. Introduction
this is often not the case-at least, not entirely. (1) I am fully informed or
Club sports teams must be recognized by the otherwise aware of, and fully
college, can be denied such recognition by the assume, all risks to person or
college, often use college facilities and property in connection with my
transportation, can receive funding from the participation in the Club
college either directly or through a student Sport...
governing body, and, as in the case of the
University of Michigan, can be subject to college (2) 1 fully and forever RELEASE,
supervision. WAIVE AND DISCHARGE and
Since the 1970s, colleges have not been COVENANT NOT TO SUE, the
liable for their adult students' actions or injuries, University...
but courts have since delineated many (3) I shall INDEMNIFY AND
exceptions to this rule. This Note will analyze HOLD HARMLESS the
the effect of college involvement in club sports University... 52
as to whether it creates a duty for a college to
protect its club athletes and those they might The above clauses come directly from a
injure. This Note will also examine whether waiver that all students at Rice University must
such a duty might exist in the future if the sign prior to participating in club sports.
current trends in the law and college policy Countless colleges and universities have similar
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forms that say virtually the same thing. Why
are these forms necessary? The doctrine of in
loco parentis was reportedly slain for good in
the 70s. Has this doctrine been resurrected as
a theory of liability, or are universities simply
putting a few more nails in Lazarus' coffin as
another example of the "belt and suspenders"
approach to modern tort liability? The answer
to this question is not yet clear, but universities
and the plaintiff's bar are both standing watch
over the grave of in loco parentis principles.
Neither is standing idly. Colleges have been
liable for student injuries under several theories,
including the "special relationship" and
respondeat superior doctrines. Even though they
are not as extreme as in loco parentis, they do
represent a return to principles inherent in the
aged doctrine.
Club sports can be dangerous. In many
instances, the fundamental reason a sport or
activity is designated as a "club" activity is that
it is much too dangerous for university
sponsorship. For example, Michigan State
University has clubs for martial arts, archery,
fencing, hockey, rugby, SCUBA diving, and
skydiving.5 3 In designating these activities as
"clubs," Michigan State found a convenient
solution to the potential liability problem if, say,
a parachute fails to open or an archer's arrow
should fly errant. Colleges and universities
presumably did not foresee, however, the
overwhelming popularity of club programs, as
they are now a significant and popular aspect
of campus life throughout the country. Colleges
market themselves as having strong club sports
programs to high school applicants, and further,
devote many resources so these programs can
flourish.54 Colleges often allow club programs
access to facilities such as playing fields,
equipment, and transportation.55 In many
instances, colleges fund club programs either
directly or through a student governing body
charged with delegating funds, usually through
an activity fee paid by students.56 Most
importantly, colleges have recently been more
willing to govern club programs by specific
regulations.57 This Note will address whether
this involvement in club activities subjects a
college to liability for injuries to, or caused by,
students engaged in club activities. It advances
the thesis that, though colleges may not
presently be liable, increased involvement in
club sports and the pending revivification of
certain in loco parentis principles may change
everything. This Note concludes by proposing
that colleges that attempt to prevent liability
by intensely regulating club athletics are
hurting, rather than helping, the matter.
Archery, Rugby, SCUBA, skydiving, and
college students-this combination begs the
sharks on the plaintiff's bar to begin circling; it
may be that a college is just chumming the
water when it affirmatively tries to protect itself
from tort claims.
II. Theories of Liability
A. Special Relationship
As collegiate athletics have grown in
scope, popularity, and importance, Courts have
begun to treat the relationship between a college
and one of its athletes as distinguishable from
the relationship between a college and one of
its ordinary students. Courts many times view
the relationship between a college and one of
its athletes as "special," and thus subject to a
different legal standard.
Courts might find that club athletes'
"special relationship" with a college gives rise
to liability for injuries. As one court explains,
"In nonfeasance cases the existence of a duty
has been recognized only during the last
century in situations involving a limited group
of special relationships between parties."
5 8
Furthermore, "special relationships are most
often premised upon the existence of mutual
dependence."5 9 Davidson involved a junior
varsity cheerleader at the University of North
Carolina.60 The J.V. cheerleading squad had no
coach, leaving the students to teach themselves
various stunts and routines. 61 The university
provided the J.V. team with uniforms,
transportation, the use of facilities, and physical
education credit for the athletes. 62 The
University only made the J.V. team perform
for donors to the University and at trade shows,
and required a minimum grade point average.
63
The court managed to find a special relationship
between the state university and cheerleader
based upon the facts that (1) she was a member
of a "school-sponsored, intercollegiate team,"
(2) there was a relationship of mutual
dependence between the cheerleader and the
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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university, insofar as the school utilized the
teams service at many sporting events and the
cheerleaders received uniforms and the use of
facilities from the school, and (3) the school
"exerted a high degree of control over its
cheerleaders."' This three-prong test marked
a shift from Bradshaw and its ilk, as it blurred
the once bright line between NCAA-sanctioned
athletics and other forms of athletic activity.
The court also found a special
relationship in Kleinecht v. Gettysburg College,
in which a lacrosse player who was "actively
recruited" suffered an injury at a "scheduled
athletic practice for an intercollegiate team
sponsored by the College under the supervision
of College employees." 65 The court based its
holding on the fact that the student was "not
engaged in his private affairs as a student.f
66
The court held this notwithstanding the fact
that the lacrosse practice at which the plaintiff
was injured occurred in the fall, whereas
lacrosse is a spring sport.67 These off-season
practices were held primarily to enable the team
to get to know each other.6 No trainers were
present at this practice. Furthermore, contact
or impact injuries, which are normally
associated with lacrosse, were highly unlikely
given the level of practice that was occurring.
69
In fact, the plaintiff in Kleinecht dropped dead
of a cardiac arrest, an injury that had never
occurred in any sporting event or practice at
the defendant college. Nonetheless, the court
saw the injury as foreseeable and found a duty
on the part of the college.70 It explained:
Although the Hanson court did not
specify the theory on which it
predicated this duty, we think it reached
the correct result, and we predict that
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
would conclude that a similar a duty
exists on the facts of this case. Like the
lacrosse student in Hanson, Drew chose
to attend Gettysburg College because
he was persuaded it had a good lacrosse
program, a sport in which he wanted
to participate at the intercollegiate level.
Head Trainer Donolli actively recruited
Drew to play lacrosse at the College. At
the time he was stricken, Drew was not
engaged in his own private affairs as a
student at Gettysburg College. Instead,
he was participating in a scheduled
athletic practice for an intercollegiate
team sponsored by the College under
the supervision of College employees.
On these facts we believe that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would
hold that a special relationship existed
between the College and Drew that was
sufficient to impose a duty of reasonable
care on the College.
71
At the opposite end of the spectrum as
Davidson and Kleinecht is Whitlock. The Whitlock
court found no special relationship between a
university and a student who suffered an injury
while jumping on a trampoline outside a
fraternity house, as the student was engaging
in his own "private recreational pursuits."
y2
Here, the court said:
The extent of control actually exerted
by the University over the fraternity
has been minimal. The University has
supervised fire drills in the fraternity
house and has required the fraternity
to place a grid over one of its window
wells because of
"Perhaps what distinguishes
club sports from varsity pro-
grams more than anything is
the third facet of the
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by the university official, which appears of an organized, school sponsored
to have been only advisory as the athletic event involving children, like
fraternity failed to comply, the that found in Beckett, this case involves
a group of
college students
"There is obviously a slid- who get together
to practice
ing scale in determining baseball forvarious reasons
whether the three Davidson in the city park.While Taylor did
factors are satisfied:' notify the school
of his intentions
and secured
University's supervision has related
primarily to fire protection,
maintenance and repairs. We conclude
that the lease, and the University's
actions pursuant to its rights under the
lease, provide no basis of dependence
by the fraternity members upon which
a special relationship can be found to
exist between the University and the
fraternity members that would give rise
to a duty upon the University to take
affirmative action to assure that
recreational equipment such as a
trampoline is not used under unsafe
conditions.
73
An Indiana court, in Swanson v. Wabash
College, applies this theory in its finding that
there is no duty on the part of a college when
its student was injured at a student-organized,
off-season practice for the college baseball team
in a public park. 74 Though the facts are
surprisingly similar to those in Kleinecht, in
Swanson, the court found that direct funding
by the college administration, the use of college
equipment, and recognition of the practices by
administration and the baseball coach "[did]
not raise these baseball practices to the level of
a college sponsored event or even bring them
into question." It elaborated as follows:
[T]he Wabash College students playing
recreational baseball were well aware
that there would be no professional
coaching assistance or supervision, or
any written guidelines for play. Instead
money for
baseballs from
the Dean of Men this does not raise these
baseball practices to the level of a college
sponsored event or even bring them
into question.7"
Though Swanson does not specifically address
club sports, it seems that the court's reasoning
may still apply.
Swanson shows that college funding is
but one of many factors for determining college
liability. Yet, colleges do not directly fund club
athletics often. There is a possibility that
moneys granted to a club by a student
governing body to a club are not a factor at all
in establishing liability, even if the delegated
money comes from a mandatory fee assessed
by the college on all students. The Eighth
Circuit held that the delegation of funds
through the student senate of a state university
was considered state action, but based this
opinion on the fact that "the University did
have final say over funding decisions," as
"decisions concerning financing of student
organizations may be appealed to the Vice
Chancellor for Student Services." 76 There is a
genuine issue, then, as to whether a grant from
a student governing body would be considered
in measuring a club's relationship to the school
if there is no appeal process or "final say" by
the administration.
After cases like Bradshaw, a clear policy
emerged in favor of sparing colleges liability
for the voluntary actions of their students.
Courts, absent a special relationship, will almost
always treat college students as adults
responsible for their own actions and do not
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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hold colleges liable for injuries that befall their
students or others as a result. As the Swanson
court explained, "College students.. .are not
children. Save for a few legal exceptions, they
are adult citizens ready, able, and willing to be
responsible for their own actions. Colleges.. .are
not expected to assume a role anything akin to
in loco parentis or a general insurer."' Even in
cases involving intramural sports, which
involve a much higher level of college funding,
involvement, and control, this policy usually
guides courts. In Kyriazis v. Univ. of West
Virginia, a West Virginia Court laid it out clearly:
The difference between intramural
programs and sports clubs lies mainly
in the degree of control the University
exercises over each. Although the Board
undertakes no role with the creation,
organization, regulation or supervision
of club sports, including the Rugby
Club, it does actively control intramural
programs.
78
In Ochoa v. California State University,
the court held that a student injured during an







and that it was
"aware of no
s u c h
authority.. -holding
that a college or
university
forms a special
Though no court has found a college
liable for injuries to a club athlete yet, such a
finding may not be far from now. More courts
are replacing simple principles, like the one
found in Bradshaw, with multifaceted tests, like
that of Davidson. The Davidson test states that
there are three factors to determine liability."'
They are (1) whether the team is school
sponsored and involved in intercollegiate
competition, (2) whether there is a relationship
of mutual dependence between the athlete and
the university, and (3) whether the school
"exerted a high degree of control over the
athlete."'8 It seems that there at least exists a
material issue of fact as to whether these factors
are satisfied with regard to a club athlete.
The Davidson test provides the perfect
avenue towards college liability for injuries to
club athletes. There is a sliding scale to
determine whether the three Davidson factors
are satisfied. There is a wide spectrum of
possible college involvement in sports. Even
among NCAA-sanctioned sports, colleges treat
athletes who partake in different sports
distinctly. School sponsorship can entail no
more than allowing a club team to use college
facilities-a stadium, field, or swimming pool-
"a college will not be liable
for the actions of club
athletes which result in
injuries to third parties
under the doctrine of
respondeat superior."
relationship
with its adult students, giving rise to a duty to
protect them ... merely by organizing and
sponsoring an intramural activity."79 Cases like
Ochoa stand in the way of the proposition that
colleges are liable for club athletes' injuries, as
college involvement in club sports likely falls
far short of "organizing and sponsoring." As
time passes, this may change since courts have
started to erode the principle set forth in
Bradshaw and colleges extend their authority
further into the realm of club athletics.
or delegating funds to the team for equipment
or promotion, whether the club is funded
directly by the college or delegated by a student
governing body. Furthermore, as club sports
become more popular with current and
prospective students, either as athletes or
spectators, it might become tempting for
colleges to allow club teams greater access to
facilities, equipment, and funding. The
relationship of mutual dependence could be
satisfied by those factors discussed earlier in
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importantly,
the recognition of the program. The college
would depend on the club team to attract
prospective students and to create a more
effective sense of school spirit throughout the
student body and community. Though the
mutual dependence is not equivalent to that
between NCAA athletes and their schools, it is
still substantial. If trends continue, the line
separating a club athlete and many NCAA
athletes may turn out to be a distinction
without a difference.
Perhaps what distinguishes club sports
from varsity programs more than anything is
the third facet of the Davidson test, control. The
lack of control has historically been the
cornerstone of club sports at American colleges
and universities. Club sports exist either
because not enough students have interest in a
given activity to make it a college-sponsored
team, or because the activity is such that the
college or university does not have the means
or desire to regulate and support it (many times
because it wishes to avoid the liability that
comes with sponsorship of a high-risk activity).
Though club sports have traditionally been free
of college control for the most part, that is
changing. To look at the University of
Michigan's twenty-one page manual regulating
club programs, the term laissez faire does not
exactly spring to mind.82 Even without the
supervisory clause, the rules present a fairly
constraining regime if one wishes to be a club
athlete.83 They are likely comparable, or even
stricter than, the rules that were in place for
varsity athletes when courts discovered the first
"special relationship" in the context of the
college-athlete relationship.
1. Respondeat Superior
Presently, in almost all circumstances,
a college will not be liable for the actions of
club athletes that result in injuries to third
parties under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
as the relationship is not one which constitutes
any sort of employment. As one court explains,
"the doctrine of respondeat superior imposes
liability upon a master for the torts of his
servants committed while acting within the
scope of the servant's employment." 4 The
"general test" for respondeat superior liability is
whether the master had "the right to direct and
control the conduct of the alleged servant at
the time the negligent act occurred." 85
Colleges can exercise a certain degree
of control over the conduct of their students,
but respondeat superior liability requires an
"employer-employee" relationship to exist and
that the tortious actor acts "within the scope of
the servant's employment."86 It is unlikely that
a court will recognize a club athlete as an
employee or servant of the college. In Swanson,
the court held that no employment relationship
existed between the college and a varsity athlete
when that athlete organized off-season practices
with funding and permission directly from the
administration.8 7 Colleges claim they do not
request or require anything of club athletes in
regard to their club activities. A college does
not benefit from nor depend on club athletes'
actions to further any goal or purpose of the
institution. Thus, it would seem that a club
athlete is likely not acting "within the scope of
his employment" while participating in club
activities. As the Campbell principle fades away
and colleges exercise more control over their
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an adequate defense to those
injuries associated with a club sport
or activity if, for any reason, the
court finds a duty on the part of the
SPORTS
students to avoid liability, this issue will likely that are associated with a club sport or activity
be revisited. if the court finds that the college has a duty.
There are two
"colleges likely are not liable for
injuries affecting or caused by club
athletes, but as the threat
becomes more real, colleges and
universities are developing
regimes to insulate them from
liability."
Certain college involvement in club
sports will certainly give rise to respondeat
superior liability. Drivers of college vans who
are appointed or approved by the college (and
almost certainly its insurance company) are
acting as employees and give rise to respondeat
superior liability. Colleges assume this in
regulating and insuring the driver's actions.
The college would not be liable, however, for
an approved and insured driver's actions if the
driver was not acting "within the scope of his
employment." In Smith v. Gardner, a
Mississippi District Court held that a college
was not liable for an accident caused when a
college basketball coach, appointed by the
college to drive the team van, was intoxicated
when he was alone and running an errand in
the team van.8 8 The Gardner court held that
there was no liability based on the fact that, "at
the time of the accident [the coach] was on a
personal errand which constituted a distinct
deviation from the responsibilities of his
employment." 89 There are likely exceptions,
then, to the college's liability, even for its
appointed and approved drivers. These
exceptions are very limited; negligent and
criminal acts, even acts that are expressly
forbidden by the employer, can still fall within
the scope of one's employment.90
III. Defenses to Liability:
Assumption of Risk and Charitable
Immunity
The doctrine of primary assumption of














chose to encounter the risk. If a court finds
that the primary implied assumption of risk
doctrine is applicable, then the defendant owes
no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the
particular risk that caused the injury."91 This
defense is likely limited to on-the-field injuries,
as there must be a "subjective analysis to
determine actual knowledge [of the risk] of a
plaintiff charged with the defense of [assumed]
risk."92 This defense is entirely fact-dependent.
If, for example, a rugby club member suffers a
broken leg in a rugby match, the court will find
he assumed the risk if the defendant can show
he knew that playing rugby created the risk of
such an injury.
The courts may be willing to stretch the
assumption of risk rule in favor of the defendant
if the plaintiff is involved in sports and the
injury occurs as a result thereof. In regard to
the liability of participants in sporting events,
some courts hold that "as a matter of law,
participants in sporting events will not be
permitted to recover against the co-participants
for injuries sustained as the result of inherent or
foreseeable dangers of the sport."93 While this
rule shows the court's view of liability for
injuries in sports, it applies only to the liability
of co-participants in sports. Certain states, such
as Ohio, have applied a foreseeability standard
to cases involving colleges and students, but it
is unclear if other states are willing to extend
the standard this far.94  In Nganga, the court
found the college was not liable simply because
the student assumed the risk of injury when
he suffered an injury while playing intramural
soccer. It states that, "[tihe injury sustained by
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Nganga was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of his decision to assume the risks
of the game and continue his participation in
the high-contact sport of soccer.
95
Colleges and universities are non-profit
entities. Thus, the doctrine of charitable
immunity has also been used effectively to
insulate schools when a club athlete is injured.
Although several states have recently abolished
such immunity, it remains an effective option
for those that have not. The case of Gilbert v.
Seton Hall University is an example of this
defense. 96 In Gilbert, the plaintiff was a student
who was injured while playing for Seton Hall's
club rugby program in a private league
organized for the competition of similar club
programs at other colleges and universities.
97
The student had filled out a liability waiver
provided by Seton Hall. 9 Seton Hall regulated
its club programs through its Department of
Recreational Services and imposed certain
regulations upon them. It specifically said there
should be no alcohol at the club's events and
frequently mentioned faculty advisors and
coaches. 99
The incident at the heart of this case took
place in New York against a team from St.
John's University. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff
or any member of the Seton Hall team, the
opponent team was banned by its respective
university and suspended by the private
league. 100 There was a keg of beer present at
the game and the field was in notable disrepair;
no faculty advisor or certified referee were
present at the game. 1 1 The injured student
eventually became a quadriplegic and sued in
New York federal court the universities involved
and the private rugby league for damages
under diversity jurisdiction. 10 2 The central
question for the court was whether to apply
New Jersey law, which would shield the
defendant universities of liability under the
doctrine of charitable immunity.
The doctrine of charitable immunity is
one "whereby non-profit corporations and
associations organized exclusively for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes are immune
from negligence liability for injuries caused to
a beneficiary of the charitable institution."" 3
Though very few states still have the charitable
immunity doctrine, and many do not apply
such a theory to colleges and universities, the
court in Gilbert gives it some weight in the
federal courts. It states that, regardless of where
the injury occurs or the plaintiff is domiciled,
the defendant university is immune if the state
in which it is located maintains the doctrine. 10 4
This is because both the plaintiff and the
university benefit from immunity from tort
actions.10 5 The court explained:
Charitable immunity reduces the cost
at which an institution can provide its
services, and, because the institution has
no profit motive, these savings are
presumably passed on to some extent
to the institution's beneficiaries; in
return, individuals who choose to take
advantage of the institution's services
bear the risk that any injury they suffer
due to the negligence of the charitable
institution will not be compensated by
the institution. By electing to attend an
institution that is protected by and
benefits from New Jersey charitable
immunity laws, Gilbert has presumably
obtained a better value for his (or his
parents') money than he would have
obtained if Seton
"If colleges are able to see the
above distinction between the
natural reaction to injuries
during a school-sanctioned
NCAA event and those during
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interest in having him bear a related
burden.
106
The charitable immunity defense effectively
shielded Seton Hall from liability, but the tone
throughout the opinion reflects the importance
of the court's decision as to which state's law
should apply. Though it was never expressly
said in the opinion, the court did not use the
same language that earlier courts did regarding
the plaintiff's "private affairs." Luckily for the
university, however, the court did reference his
voluntary choice to attend a New Jersey
university, and this proved to be enough.
IV. Exculpatory Agreement
To further insulate itself from liability, a
college could require students to sign an
exculpatory agreement. This is because "[a]
party may contract out of his duty to exercise
reasonable care with respect to the other party
and thereby exonerate himself of
liability.. .without offending the public policy
of the state." 10 7 In the majority of cases, these
clauses are upheld; in some cases, however,
exculpatory clauses are considered
unconscionable. 18 To be unconscionable, a
contract must be "one that no sensible person
not under delusion, duress or in distress would
make, and one that no honest and fair person
would accept." 10 9 The inequality of bargaining
power and whether "the transaction affects the
public interest such as... types of businesses
generally thought to be suitable for regulation
or which are thought of as a practical necessity
for some members of the public," are areas in
which an exculpatory clause might be found
void due to public policy or
unconscionability."
0
The inequality of the bargaining power
between the student and the college likely does
not make exculpatory agreements
unconscionable or void for public policy, but
there are cases in other jurisdictions in which
courts found such clauses to be void."' The
court in Kyriazis based its finding that there
was inequality of bargaining power on the fact
that, "[i]f appellant wished to play club rugby
for the University, he had no choice but to sign
the Release."112 The mere fact that a student
could not play if he did not sign the exculpatory
agreement could be determinative, but most
jurisdictions still view mandatory exculpatory
agreements as common and enforceable."3 It
is presently unlikely that the court would find
an exculpatory agreement between a college
and a student unconscionable, but it continues
to be a possibility.
Presently, it seems that colleges are likely
not liable for injuries affecting or caused by club
athletes. As the threat becomes more real,
colleges and universities are developing regimes
to insulate them from liability. There are two
ways to do this. One way is the "less is more"
attitude. By refusing to involve itself at all with
club sports, a college or university might
effectively place a student's involvement clearly
within the realm of his private affairs. This,
however, is risky, as a few bad court decisions
could damage a college's budget fairly quickly.
Another way a college can insulate itself
from liability is to take the approach that the
University of Michigan takes with its club
sports programs, insofar as it conditions club
recognition on whether a university entity
"continues to have the necessary resources to
supervise the club and its activities.""' 4 In
essentially assuming the duty to supervise, the
university almost certainly avails itself to some
amount of liability."5 So long as the university
is not posturing, i.e., so long as it is willing and
able to supervise the club and its activities, this
seems like a plausible alternative. This is a
costly approach, but in the alternative, it may
be more efficient than losing in court after a
graduate student breaks his neck while
skydiving.
Removed from the budgetary and
administrative realities of running a college or
university, club sports might seem like the
perfect battlefield on which universities can
make their last stand against the principles of
in loco parentis as a mode of liability, since courts
and legislatures have not yet set their sights on
dismantling the current system. If not in the
realm of club sports, then where should colleges
make such a stand? Colleges and universities
have already lost the battle in the dormitories,
the fraternity houses, and on the NCAA-
sanctioned athletic field. Why, then, should
they choose club athletics as the domain to
combat liability? There are several reasons to
support such a tactic, and several policies which
could further collegiate goals in doing so.
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It must be remembered that many of
the duties that arose in the eighties and nineties
came from increased media attention to on-
campus sex assault, alcohol abuse, and hazing,
which led to a major shift in public opinion.
16
This widespread attention is not present in the
realm of club sports. In fact, public opinion
regarding club sports is likely the opposite,
insofar as many Americans feel that adult
students should be able to do whatever they
like on their own time within the law.
There seems to be distinguishing factors
between injuries in club sports and injuries in
those areas where colleges have recently been
found to be liable (i.e. fraternities, dormitories,
and NCAA athletics). Injuries leading to
increased liability are almost always one of two
types. They are either (1) injuries inflicted upon
an innocent student-victim, such as the rape
of a female student in her dormitory, or (2)
injuries to a student while they are engaging in
activities organized by the college for its own
benefit, such as an injury to a NCAA athlete.
Club athletes who become injured while
partaking in an inherently dangerous activity
do not fall into either of these two groups.
When a student is injured while playing rugby,
a sport of virtually unparalleled violence, the
natural human inference is that such an injury
is the consequence of participating in such an
inherently dangerous activity. Colleges need
to recognize this human reaction as one
inference, as opposed to the immediate
emotional reaction to a young college female
raped in her dorm room. Colleges should also
distinguish the natural reaction when an NCAA
athlete is injured during school sanctioned
events as being one relative to fairness. It is
hardly fair that colleges derive so much benefit
from their athletes without taking steps to
insure their safety.
If colleges are able to see the above
distinction between the natural reaction to
injuries during a school-sanctioned NCAA
event and those during club sports, they should
shape their policy accordingly. They should
not market club sports to prospective students.
They should refrain from funding, directly or
indirectly, club activities. Most importantly,
they should refrain from governing club
athletics with regulations outside of those that
apply to all students. Assumption of risk or
exculpatory agreements may not be the catch-
all answer that colleges seek, but they would
not hurt a college's cause. By such measures, a
college could squarely place club athletics in
the realm of a student's private affairs. It is
unclear whether the modern college or
university would be willing to partake in such
a laissez faire policy. In the past, institutions
have apparently wanted more involvement in
areas of potential liability, but it would almost
certainly work to their benefit to consider
otherwise.
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